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ABSTRACT  
 
Uganda, a former British colony, has been in a state of conflict since achieving 
independence in 1962. The current government has been at arms with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) for over 20 years, making it Africa’s longest running war. 
Exploring the root causes of the conflict and establishing a common historical 
narrative is crucial to identifying prospects for peace. Uganda’s unique colonial 
legacy provides a framework for understanding the patterns of government policies 
and attitudes that have fostered an atmosphere of unrest and rebellion. The imperial 
mission established the territory through policies of violence, subjugation, 
exploitation, intimidation, and division, sowing seeds of disunity into Uganda’s fertile 
soil. Successive regimes after independence followed similar patterns of behavior 
toward their citizens, capitalizing on imperial stereotypes and regional divisions of 
labor to elevate themselves and gain power. The Acholi people in the northern region 
have born the heaviest burden under the weight of exclusionary policies and 
demeaning rhetoric, and are blamed for much of the conflict. For Uganda to move 
toward peace, the attitudes and policies that are tearing society apart and perpetuating 
the war need to be reversed, the truth needs to be told in an atmosphere conducive to 
forgiveness and responsibility, and the nation needs leadership that seeks national 
unity and reconciliation over personal wealth and power. 
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I. Introduction 
The British established the Ugandan protectorate in 1894, and its development 
was driven by a “divide-and-rule” strategy,1 intentionally weakening indigenous 
power networks and institutions. When Uganda achieved independence in 1962, it 
could not break out of the fragmented, hierarchical organization imposed by the 
British. Ethnic, religious, and sub-regional tensions escalated in the following years, 
as different groups contended for state power. Oppressive military regimes and 
violent insurgencies characterized much of the modern historical development since 
independence, culminating in the longest civil war on the African continent, 
beginning in 1986 and continuing through today.
2
  
Looking at the tiny Ugandan nation would now reveal a social fabric torn 
along ethnic, religious, political, historical, and interpersonal lines, severed and 
frayed and in need of mending. The two decades of war between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government has devastated the region. The 
catalyst for this conflict can be traced back through the years of independence to the 
era of colonial administration. That is where threads of disunity were woven into the 
fabric and slowly unraveled in communities of those subjected to imperial rule, 
giving them an incentive to rebel and a pattern of violence to emulate. Rather than 
frame the conflict in terms of chronological events, then, I’m exploring the patterns of 
the current government’s behavior that reflect the practices of Uganda’s colonial 
                                                 
1 Chris Dolan, Understanding war and its continuation: The case of northern Uganda, 70 (University 
of London, Ph.D. dissertation, 2005). 
2 See Human Rights Watch, Africa's Longest War Still Taking Lives, 19 June 2009, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a3f8d3c1e.html (accessed 11 December 2009). 
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predecessors and have perpetuated the violence. These patterns indicate practical 
avenues to peace, speaking to Uganda’s particular worldview and colonial legacy.  
My argument is that a particular approach to truth and reconciliation, as 
guided by an African perspective sensitive to the role of religion in oppression and 
liberation, is the way to bring peace to Uganda as a healing process. Therefore, the 
thesis does the following: in chapter one, I frame a relationship between human rights 
and religion; next I connect this to the place of human rights in the African context 
understood as a postcolonial political context where the rights of peoples are given 
political centrality; I draw out of this context the role of economic, social, and cultural 
rights in escalating armed conflict since independence, and ultimately the need for 
addressing all the root issues of Uganda’s conflict in light of its colonial legacy, from 
a reoriented worldview sensitive to religion and the particular Ugandan perspective.  
Having begun with a discussion of the foundations of a flourishing society 
that meet human rights standards within Uganda’s specific cultural and postcolonial 
context, in the second chapter I will narrate the historical background to the war by 
describing how the imperialist mission represented an inversion of these relationships 
that are fundamental to peace and prosperity in a community. A healthy society 
requires a kind of spiritual consensus that acknowledges the value in the individual 
and the community, and sees resources as belonging to both. The colonial attitudes 
and policies corrupted society in an effort to secure power through control, 
containment, violence, and exploitation. These instruments of subjugation carried 
over into successive regimes after independence, and the ideologies that fueled such 
treatment have permeated the deepest recesses of Ugandan society and culture.   
  3 
The imperialist mission was centered on the extraction of resources at a 
minimum cost to the colonizing government. Racist ideologies legitimated their 
efforts to “civilize” and “protect” the local inhabitants through violence, intimidation, 
and militarization. The reification and codification of ethnic identity was instrumental 
in the colonial administration’s effort to control the region, creating more rigid ethnic 
and socioeconomic divides that were then employed in the post-independence 
struggles for power.
 3
 Resentment and violence have since characterized interethnic 
relationships and major shifts in power. 
The government’s response to the LRA resistance has revealed a lack of 
commitment to peace, favoring the military option, often in tandem with diplomatic 
efforts, and turning civilians into military targets for both government soldiers and 
rebels. The forced resettlement of millions of people into “protected villages,” or 
camps, has largely been a policy to control and contain the movements of northerners, 
as both a military strategy to monitor potential rebel supporters and a form of social 
torture.
4
  
In the dominant discourse, the war is narrated as perpetrated by the LRA 
against its own people and, therefore, irrational,
5
 as well as peripheral to the country’s 
development and success. It is described as principally religious and ethnic in nature, 
and both sides have rhetorically taken stands on religious and ethnic grounds in their 
                                                 
3 SVERKER FINNSTROM, LIVING WITH BAD SURROUNDINGS, WAR AND EXISTENTIAL UNCERTAINTY IN 
ACHOLI LAND, NORTHERN UGANDA 10 (Duke University Press 2003). 
4 Dolan describes the war in Uganda as a guise under which social torture is perpetrated. See supra 
note 1. 
5 Dolan, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
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dealings with each other.
6
 Colonial stereotypes and slanderous references are woven 
into government rhetoric regarding the rebels in an effort to promote itself as the 
rational party to the conflict and the protector of its citizens.
7
 In the eyes of the world, 
then, the conflict is largely seen as a humanitarian affair, with very little to no 
political dimension.  
Having traced the conflict back through the years since independence to 
Uganda’s imperial origins and unveiling patterns of subjugation and religious 
manipulation, in chapter 4 I will indicate avenues to peace that essentially bridge the 
chasms of social divide. Because the consequences of colonialism were 
overwhelmingly in the destruction of social cohesion, the best mechanisms for peace 
will be in the reweaving and rebuilding of relationships between individuals, tribes, 
communities, and each of those respective groups with their government. A common 
national narrative based on the truth and facilitating accountability and reconciliation 
is the first step in this long process. Justice must be served, but it must resonate with 
the community in a way that not only reduces impunity, but supports the victims and 
builds peace between people. The truth encourages healing, and is absolutely 
paramount to achieving justice as long as it is accompanied by forgiveness, 
responsibility, restitution, and reform. Finally, strong indigenous leadership is 
essential to advancing unity and prosperity—leadership that will bring about a 
fundamental shift in the way the government engages with its citizens, antithetical to 
Uganda’s colonial legacy.  
                                                 
6 Id., at 133. 
7 Finnstrom, supra note 3, at 113. 
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II. Peace and Justice 
A. The goal of society: shalom 
A bird’s eye view of the world shows the community as a social fabric made 
up of threads interwoven and interdependent. Individual lives are as fragile as thread, 
but as many of them are woven together into the fabric, they are strong and beautiful. 
In the same way that the strength of the individual thread is only as strong as the 
fabric into which it is woven, so the individual lives in a community are measured by 
the strength of their interdependency. 
When people with access to money, resources, and advantages see these as 
belonging not just to themselves but invest what they have in the community rather 
than clinging to it, there is social shalom. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, shalom is 
“the webbing together of God, humans, and all creation in justice, fulfillment, and 
delight”8 We usually call it peace, but shalom means far more than a ceasefire or 
peace of mind, it means “universal flourishing, wholeness, and delight.”9 It is an 
“ideal in which peace combines with justice; but more than that, when peace 
combines with delight in right relationships with God, with self, with fellow humans 
and with nature.”10 
                                                 
8 Neal Plantinga, Educating for Shalom: Our Calling as a Christian College, available at 
http://www.calvin.edu/about/shalom.htm. 
9 Id. 
10 Ron Wells, Educating for Shalom (Perspectives: A Journal of Reformed Thought, June/July 2004) 
available at http://www.rca.org/Page.aspx?pid=3338. 
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The realization of peace, or shalom, is what society aspires to; it is the goal of 
our advancement. This webbing together of society, however, depends on individual 
attitudes and distribution of resources. Justice is when the resources of those with 
more are being invested into the lives of those with less. Injustice is when people hold 
onto their resources, ignoring the needs in the community or seeking to gain power 
over others, because then the social fabric unravels. The breakdown of society is in 
the social structures that spread misery and injustice, “squelching the realization of 
what human life was meant to be.”11 The laws and policies and ways of functioning 
and dealing with each other as a society become the instruments of injustice.  
Nick Wolterstoff argues that “in response to this we are not to avert our eyes 
from our social condition…rather, we are to struggle to alter those structures and the 
dynamics behind them, so that the alienation is diminished and the realization 
advanced.”12 Justice, then, is striving to go to the places where the fabric is breaking 
down and weaker members of society are falling through, taking resources and 
plunging them into those areas of the community, and ultimately changing the 
structures that oppress and weigh people down.  
1. Belief in God as moral ground for human rights 
 
The concept of shalom draws a profound connection between religion and 
human rights as the underpinnings of a flourishing society. Harvard Law professor 
Alan Dershowitz concluded that the notion of inherent dignity in every individual 
couldn’t be derived from nature, because nature thrives on violence and predation, on 
                                                 
11 Nick Wolterstoff, Until Justice and Peace Embrace (Eerdmans, 1983), at 23. 
12 Id. 
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the survival of the fittest.
13
 As Ronald Dworkin observes, if we want to defend human 
rights, we must try to discover something beyond utility that argues for these rights.
14
  
In Michael Perry’s book, Toward a Theory of Human Rights, he concludes 
that “there is a religious ground for the morality of human rights,” but that “it is far 
from clear that there is a non-religious ground, a secular ground, for human rights.”15 
Sartre also famously argued that if God does not exist, “there can no longer be any 
good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is 
nowhere written that ‘the good’ exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since 
we are now upon the plane where there are only men.”16 If there is no God, then there 
is no way to determine if any one action is “moral” or “immoral,” leaving it up to the 
subjective opinion of individuals to say they like something or think it’s right.  
It could then be argued that human rights were constructed because it’s in the 
best interest of the community.
17
 However, if rights are simply based on majority 
opinion, there is nothing to appeal to when the majority decides it’s not in their best 
interest to provide human rights. Then it must be determined who has the right to 
declare what is right and wrong and codify it for the rest of society. If the underlying 
foundation of human rights principles is not rooted in the existence of an objective 
standard of morality, the majority will always potentially oppress or seek to 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE, 15 (Little, Brown, 
2002). 
15 MICHAEL PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 6 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
16 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM, EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOYEVSKY TO 
SARTRE (ed. Walter Kaufman, Meridian Publishing Company, 1989) available at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm. 
17 TIM KELLER, THE REASON FOR GOD 156 (Penguin Books Ltd, 2008). 
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exterminate the minority, and the minority will have no defense.
18
 In contrast, a belief 
in a God with an objective moral standard supports the worldview that sees rights as 
belonging to the community not just yourself, with all individuals and minorities 
included in the great fabric of creation. 
Without an objective standard we can’t justify our obligation to morality, but 
we know it exists. Niezsche understood this problem, “The masses blink and say: 
‘We are all equal—Man is but man, before God we are all equal.’ Before God! But 
now this God has died.”19 Raimond Gaita, an atheist, also admits: 
Only someone who is religious can speak seriously of the sacred…We may 
say that all human beings are inestimably precious, that they are ends in 
themselves, that they are owed unconditional respect, that they possess 
inalienable rights, and, of course, that they posses inalienable dignity. In my 
judgment these are ways of trying to say what we feel a need to say when we 
are estranged from the conceptual resources [i.e. God] we need to say...Not 
one of [these statement about human beings] has the power of the religious 
way of speaking…that we are sacred because God loves us, his children.”20 
2. Religion as an instrument of oppression 
If the world was made by a God of peace, justice, and love, we know that 
violence, oppression, and hate are wrong. Furthermore, if the world is fallen, broken, 
and needs to be redeemed, that explains the violence and disorder seen all over the 
world. “If you believe human rights are a reality, then it makes much more sense that 
God exists than that he does not.”21 The foundation for peace and justice does not 
simply end with a belief in God, however. It’s important to distinguish between 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part IV, On the Higher Man, near the end of section I. 
20 RAIMOND GAITA, A COMMON HUMANITY: THINKING ABOUT LOVE AND TRUTH AND JUSTICE. 
(Quoted in MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 and 17-18). 
21 Keller, supra note 17, at 156. 
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spiritual beliefs, because not just any belief in God or an objective moral standard 
results in the preservation of human rights and the overall shalom in a community.  
A question posed by Nietzsche sheds light on barriers to peace in the religious 
worldview: “Why does man not see things? He is himself standing in the way: he 
conceals things.”22 Religious people can just as easily become conduits of evil as non-
religious; look at any dictatorial regime to see that neither the religious or secular 
have cornered the market on evil. The idea that one group has the ultimate truth and 
holds the ultimate standard by which all other people are judged leads to racism, 
slavery, and genocide. In the quest for power, governments and rebels wield the 
doctrines of religion to legitimate their cause and justify their violence. They indeed 
cannot see truth that leads to the peaceful flourishing in society because they are 
blinded by their own selfish ambition and fear of losing power and control.  
Imperialism, especially, is rooted in an ultimate standard of morality that has 
bred only self-righteousness, self-absorption, and superiority over the “savages” of 
distant lands. Using their moral code as a measure of civilization, colonial powers 
justified economic expansion at an exorbitant cost to the “less civilized” societies in 
territories containing a wealth of natural resources and manpower to be exploited. 
Even missionaries who may have opposed the more cruel aspects of colonial policies 
were supportive of colonization as far as it facilitated a political environment that 
would allow for missionary activity, so that they found themselves playing an 
important role in the legitimization of imperial expansion in all forms.
23
 
                                                 
22 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, DAYBREAK, s. 483 (R.J. Hollingdale translation). 
23 Exploring Africa, Unit Two: Studying Africa through the Social Studies, Module 7B: African 
History, the Era of the Global Encroachment, Teacher’s Edition, available at 
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B. Traditional African Culture 
Having considered the foundation of human rights as dictated by a religious 
worldview and the potential for manipulation of religion for the purpose of gaining 
power, we will now consider how a religious worldview, based on the biblical 
understanding of shalom, is favorable to the particularly African perspective. From 
this worldview, for an administration of justice to positively contribute to a 
flourishing society, human rights need to affirm both the dignity of the individual and 
the good of the community. No single culture can speak for all of humankind or solve 
its problems,
24
 but generally the collective nature of traditional African society is 
conducive to the realization of human rights and social shalom. African society 
broadly operates from a worldview of group solidarity and collective responsibility, 
in contrast to Western notions of individualism and the social contract that free the 
individual from the constriction of the group.
25
  
1. African Humanism 
African humanism emphasizes this interdependency of human beings, putting 
the individual on a continuum with the dead, living, and yet unborn.
26
 Humanity’s 
“self-centeredness is countered…by a deep and lasting socialization towards we-
thinking resulting in a conception of the self that is unlike the Western conception.”27 
                                                                                                                                           
http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/teachers/curriculum/m7b/activity2.php (accessed December 10, 
2009). 
24
 Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective, 9 HUM. 
RIGHTS. QUART. 309, 325 (1987).   
25
 Id, at 323. 
26 Jeanne M. Woods, Rights as Slogans: A Theory of Human Rights Based on African Humanism, 17 
NATL. BLACK L. J., 52-66 (2003). 
27
 Cobbah, supra note 24, at 325. 
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Within this view of the African self as interdependent is the double notion of rights 
and duties, whereby the community helps the individual exercise his or her rights so 
that person can contribute to community development; thus the duties of the 
individual are the rights of the community and vice versa. Personhood is inherently 
connected to community, with obligations to the self, the family, and society.
28
 
There is also a responsibility of the individual to future generations. However, 
nihilism prevents many African societies from being capable of investing in the future 
of their children and their children’s children. Women in Uganda have had many 
children for the sole purpose of having additional labor contributions; these children 
have little hope for an education or a life outside of extreme poverty. Not only that, 
but the idea of preserving the environment for future generations is put on the 
backburner when civil war displaces peoples from their land and forces them to 
overuse small plots in IDP camps.  
2. Personalist Morality 
Simeon Ilesanmi argues that a personalist morality centered on the religious 
principle of relationality bridges the gap between individualists and collectivists.
29
 In 
a collectivist society, the individual’s dignity is affirmed by their membership in the 
group, while in an individualist society, the self is prioritized at the expense of others, 
and society suffers as a result.
30
 Personalism, on the other hand, recognizes both the 
                                                 
28
 Woods, supra note 26. 
29 Simeon O. Ilesanmi, Human Rights Discourse in Modern Africa: A Comparative Religious Ethical 
Perspective 29 J. RELIG. ETHICS 293 (2001). 
30 Id. 
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individuality and sociality of people.
31
 Through the concept of justice as dictated by 
religion, people are aware of their responsibility for their own existence as well as 
others, including what is right and wrong in how we treat one another, as opposed to 
acting on self-interest alone, or in complete self-denial. 
3. Acholi Worldview: Bad Surroundings 
Narrowing in on a view of the Acholi people in the north of Uganda shows 
how traditional culture and religion intersect in daily life in the context of protracted 
armed conflict. The Acholi have suffered the most as a result of the ongoing war, and 
they will often describe these living conditions as “bad surroundings,” both when the 
fighting is intense and when it is at a lull, because there is still no peace.
32
 As they 
struggle for balance and a comprehensible life in the midst of war and displacement, 
they still build for a future where “wealth can be imagined, even planned for.”33 
Growing cattle, young people getting married, democracy and the opportunities for 
education are signs of “good surroundings,” on which they set their hopes.34 Good 
surroundings are “when things are normal, the society thriving, facing and 
overcoming crisis.”35 Bad surroundings speak less about bad things happening and 
more about the stress and uncertainty about the future as the conflict continues, the 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Finnstrom, supra note 3, at 10. 
33 Id, at 11. 
34 Id. 
35 OKOT P’BITEK ARTIST, THE RULER: ESSAYS ON ART, CULTURE, AND VALUES 27 (Nairobi: Heinemann 
Kenya, 1986). 
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fact that “the whole thing is out of hand, that the entire apparatus of the culture cannot 
cope with the menace anymore.”36 
The concept of bad surroundings is derived from a lack of control, so it’s easy 
to see how religion is employed in the existential effort to cope with difficult 
situations in order to exercise some control, especially if the “drive to experience the 
world as meaningful” is the foremost of human universals.37 Clifford Geertz describes 
man as entirely dependent on symbols. “Without our ability to create, grasp, and use 
symbols…he would be…a kind of formless monster with neither sense of direction 
nor power of self-control, a chaos of spasmodic impulses and vague emotions.”38 
Malinowski said that when the order of things cannot be controlled fully, humans turn 
to ritual and magic to reduce uncertainty and anxiety.
39
 Finnstrom describes this as a 
sort of “lived realism” where “religious beliefs and practices are used to diagnose, 
explain, and interpret the individual causes of misfortune and illness.”40  
The meaning of peace and the means to achieve it are vastly different in the 
competing dominant world religions, but in Uganda, the Acholi spirit world is mixed 
with precepts from both Christianity and Islam. Unfortunately, syncretism in Uganda 
has served to extend the pretext for superiority into the attitudes and actions of 
successive regimes as well as rebel groups, as to existentially negate the distinct 
message of either religion. What are left are religious precepts out of the context of 
                                                 
36 Id, at 27. 
37 ALF. HORNBORG, THE POWER OF THE MACHINE: GLOBAL INEQUALITIES OF ECONOMY, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND ENVIRONMENT 237 (Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press, 2001). 
38 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 99 (Basic Books, 47
th
 
Edition, 2003) (1973). 
39 BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION, AND OTHER ESSAYS (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday Achor Books, 1948). 
40 Finnstrom, supra note 3, at 27. 
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their original message, wielded for power and control by both the Ugandan 
government and the LRA.  
However, the biblical worldview, if understood in its entirety, is still the most 
powerful frame of reference for achieving peace, and resonates deeply with African 
circumstances because it is a faith of hope for the poorest of the poor. In fact, there 
has been a significant shift in Christianity’s geographical center of gravity to the 
global south, so that today, Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans are more typical 
representatives of Christianity than Americans or Europeans.
41
 “Nearly 200 years 
after the first wave of missionaries arrived in Africa, Christianity is growing faster 
here than anywhere else in the world. There are more than 390 million Christians in 
sub-Saharan Africa today, up from 117 million in 1970, a trend due mostly to 
evangelism.” according to the Center for the Study of Global Christianity.42 
The Masai, a semi-nomadic tribe in neighboring Kenya and northern 
Tanzania, have captured the heart of the Christian faith from an African perspective 
in a creed composed in 1960 in collaboration with missionaries:  
We believe in the one High God, who out of love created the beautiful world 
and everything good in it. He created Man and wanted Man to be happy in the 
world. God loves the world and every nation and tribe on the Earth. We have 
known this High God in darkness, and now we know Him in the light. God 
promised in the book of His word, the Bible, that He would save the world 
and all the nations and tribes. 
We believe that God made good His promise by sending His Son, Jesus 
Christ, a man in the flesh, a Jew by tribe, born poor in a little village, who left 
His home and was always on safari doing good, curing people by the power of 
God, teaching about God and man, showing the meaning of religion is love. 
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He was rejected by his people, tortured and nailed hands and feet to a cross, 
and died. He lay buried in the grave, but the hyenas did not touch him, and on 
the third day, He rose from the grave. He ascended to the skies. He is the 
Lord. 
We believe that all our sins are forgiven through Him. All who have faith in 
Him must be sorry for their sins, be baptized in the Holy Spirit of God, live 
the rules of love and share the bread together in love, to announce the Good 
News to others until Jesus comes again. We are waiting for Him. He is alive. 
He lives. This we believe. Amen.
43
 
 
The backbone of the Masai faith is a profound connection between all living 
beings created by a loving God who not only promises to save humanity, but has in 
fact entered into humanity’s suffering to display the greatest act of love in all of 
history, giving up His life and taking the wrath for our sin. 
C. Development of the African state and its regional human rights system 
1. Independence: Socialism in response to Colonialism 
Stepping back to look at the development of the independent African nation-
state, its regional human rights system can also be seen to have been greatly 
influenced by the African culture and perspective.
44
 Colonialism set the stage for a 
unique nationalist movement, though, that overemphasized the collective at the 
expense of the individual. The Organization of African Unity, for example, was 
established in the early 60’s primarily to ensure decolonization, and its concern for 
preserving the independence of states far outweighed notions of individual rights, 
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with socialism incorporated into its purposes and principles.
45
 Likewise, the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights was heavily influenced by African socialism 
and nationalism and was also, therefore, more concerned with unity, non-interference, 
and liberation than individual human rights.
46
  
El-Obaid and Appiagyei-Atua point out the problems with the socialist push, 
noting that it was born out of the myth of a merrie Africa, an idealized, conflict-free 
traditional African society that was disrupted by colonization.
47
 Leaders who wanted 
to see this society reinstated upon independence failed to analyze the political forms 
of traditional societies and the concept of rights that went with each to see that, as 
elucidated by Ilesanmi, indigenous African culture is not monolithic or homogeneous, 
nor is it morally irreproachable.
48
 There are in fact traditional practices that are 
abominable and completely devastating to human dignity. Yet, evolution within a 
society is always taking place, and those who see African culture as a commodity that 
should be “salvaged” from the past are ignoring the existential transformation of 
cultures over time.
49
 
The Charter, adopted in 1981, prioritized the community and duties, without 
recognizing the inherent rights of the individual that enable individuals to perform 
duties and contribute to the community. However, the Charter notably brought 
together civil and political rights along with economic, social, and cultural rights, and 
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peoples’ rights, making it the most comprehensive of the regional instruments.50 The 
interconnectedness and seamlessness of rights embodied in the Charter is a 
distinguishing feature that, as Chidi Anselm Odinkalu asserts, puts its implementing 
institutions and human rights advocates in a position to “pioneer imaginative 
approaches to the realization of these rights.”51 The bringing together of all three 
generations of rights highlights the value of regional arrangements, which is not in 
picking and choosing rights from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in 
realizing all of these rights in a way that is legitimate within the context and culture of 
regions of the world that have very different worldviews.   
2. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
a) Development 
One thing that states have failed to acknowledge with regard to peoples’ rights 
is that that the survival of the particular way of life of indigenous peoples “depends 
on access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources thereon.”52 The 
violation of this right is directly connected to the violation of a host of other rights 
under the charter, such as non-discrimination, freedom to take part in the cultural life 
of a community, and self-determination, to name a few. The case before the African 
Commission brought by the Social and Economic Rights Action Center against 
Nigeria was important in this regard. The Commission, mandated under Article 45 of 
                                                 
50 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis? Implementing Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 23 HUM. 
RIGHTS QUART. 327 (2001). 
51
 Id., at 335. 
52 The African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), Report of the Working Group of 
Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities 89 (2005). 
  18 
the Charter to promote and protect rights, interpret charter provisions, and undertake 
other tasks referred to it,
53
 propelled international jurisprudence on economic, social, 
and cultural rights in its decision regarding this case.  
Not only did its decision give voice to article 21, the right to freely dispose of 
wealth and natural resources, but it revealed the potential for a cross-generational 
approach to breaking barriers between all the other rights through the Commission’s 
creative interpretation of international instruments.
54
 Furthermore, though it was 
“unique to the particular history and political economy of Nigeria, the violations 
charted in the case resonate in many other African countries, and in states elsewhere 
around the world confronting the twin issues of resource exploitation and 
environmental protection in a fragile ecosystem, and where indigenous and minority 
communities and their rights are involved.”55 
The SERAC case, then, was a sort of coming of age for the Commission, 
“bringing together many principles that were scattered throughout the Commission’s 
previous decisions.”56 While Civil and Political rights had generally been given the 
most attention by the Commission, this case brought Economic, Social, and Cultural 
rights to the forefront, obliging states to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill all of 
these rights.
57
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Ironically, as progressive and important as these duties are for human rights 
jurisprudence in Africa, they serve to illuminate the gap between the promises of the 
Charter and the reality of state performance. This is especially the case for economic, 
social, and cultural rights, the provisions for which (in addition to group rights) have 
set the African human rights system apart from other regions in a very positive way, 
but which have simultaneously been very poorly enforced. It wasn’t really until 
escalating armed conflicts in the 1990’s and their associated atrocities acted as an 
impediment to economic development that the push for human rights was brought 
center stage. However, poverty and underdevelopment have been used as an excuse 
by governments to justify their non-enforcement, presupposing that economic, social, 
and cultural rights are more resource-intensive than civil and political rights.
58
 In 
reality this isn’t the case, especially considering the importance of education for even 
the potential of economic development. As Agbakwa argues, “underdevelopment 
does not justify partial enforcement any more than poverty justifies parents 
consistently feeding one child to the neglect of their other children.”59 
b) Role in armed conflict 
The non-recognition or under-conceptualization of economic and social rights 
have triggered conflicts or made them “more pervasive and intractable than they 
would have otherwise been.”60 Agbakwa argues that an “absence of mechanisms for 
adjudicating violations or threatened violations of economic and social rights makes 
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the resort to extra-legal means for redress attractive and all but inevitable.”61 He 
describes how all citizens have minimum expectations of their governments, so when 
there is no other viable means of being heard or seeing change, citizens will make 
their demands in militant terms. He concludes that “the hope for conflict prevention 
and sustainable peace building effort or strategy lies in the proper recognition of the 
role of economic and social rights in igniting these conflicts and the centrality of 
effective protection of socio-economic rights in peace building and in preventing 
future conflicts.”62  
Agbakwa nuances his argument by observing how “constitutional guarantees 
of socio-economic rights per se cannot forestall conflicts,” but that the “opportunities 
and processes they create are likely to curb incidents that usually provide motivation 
for conflicts.” These guarantees are “vital (indispensable) tools for good governance 
and peaceful coexistence based on mutual recognition of everyone’s humanity,” 
because “the greatest benefit of guaranteeing enforceable (or justiciable) rights is the 
assurance it gives to people that effective mechanisms for adjudicating violations or 
threatened violations of their rights are available.”63 
While they are not the only available means to achieving social justice, then, 
justiciable rights have potential for mediating conflict because they provide a 
“peaceful avenue for aggrieved individuals to attempt to compel a change,”64 and at 
least an opportunity "to give voice to human suffering, to make it visible, and to 
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ameliorate it."
65
 Constitutional guarantees provide a forum for the oppressed, 
"wretched of the earth,”66 to tell stories of their exclusion, dehumanization and 
marginalization.
67
 At the heart of these guarantees is the recognition of shared 
humanity between all people, which is crucial to moving forward into a peaceful 
flourishing society.  
D. Discussion 
Francis Stewart, in analyzing the horizontal inequalities among religious or 
ethnic groups and their role in inciting violent conflict, details how “human 
motivation of the actors involved is clearly at the heart of any conflict situation. If a 
conflict is to be avoided or stopped, this motivation must be understood and the 
conditions leading to a predisposition to conflict reduced or eliminated."
68
 In the 
context of protracted armed conflict, an effective justice system must help break the 
cycle of political violence by making sure that the root causes of conflict are 
recognized and addressed. If at the heart of armed conflict is a plight for socio, 
political, and economic inclusion of dehumanized and marginalized individuals or 
people groups, the attitudes and policies that have divided and denigrated them must 
be changed. A long-standing, violent conflict such as Uganda’s begs the question, 
what is the source of the violence, and what is fueling its continuation? 
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Behind all the issues relating to the understanding and enforcement of rights 
and good governance in modern African states, and particularly in Uganda, are the 
attitudes and policies of the colonial era. Colonialism wielded violence in all forms as 
an instrument of control, justified by moral supremacy and racist ideology to 
accumulate wealth and power. Because humanity’s interconnectedness is central to 
shalom in society, violence used as an instrument of power tears apart social 
relationships. Violence is then perpetuated by these severed relationships and 
exacerbated by the disparity of resources within society. Colonialism, then, paved the 
way for successive regimes to treat citizens much like the colonial subjects of the 
former territories. 
  23 
III. Historical Narrative 
We just saw how human rights are secured by a religious worldview that 
strikes a balance between the needs of the individual and the community, and how the 
particular African cultural perspective and historical circumstances have generally 
played into the development of regional human rights standards, as well as fueling 
armed conflict. Recognizing and addressing underlying historical causes of the 
current conflict in Uganda, specifically, leads to a common national narrative very 
much colored and shaped by colonialism.  
A. Colonialism: The civilizing project 
Arab traders in slaves and ivory moved into the region in the 1850s, 
devastating the area by fusing trade with robbery and setting native tribes against 
each other.
69
 The imperialist mission that followed in the late 1800’s was driven by 
competition between European nations, and was essentially designed to extract 
resources and subjugate the local population, ripping the fabric of society apart at the 
seams in the process. 
1. Racist ideology 
 
European explorers spread a mindset that conformed to the racist ideas that 
dominated Europe at the time. Samuel Baker traveled extensively through Africa on 
the imperial mission to suppress the slave trade, but his travelogues show racist 
perceptions: “The treachery of the negro is beyond belief; he has not a moral human 
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instinct, and is below the brute. How is it possible to improve such abject animals? 
They are not worth the trouble, and they are only fit for slaves, to which position their 
race appears to have been condemned.”70 
 “Racist ideologies offered timely legitimacy to the imperial dimension of this 
expansion and even legitimated the gross violence that eventually led to genocide in 
some of the imperial and industrial peripheries.”71 John Hanning Speke described the 
Africans he met as “both morally and physically, little better than brutes, and as yet 
there is no better prospect for them.”72 He spoke for them by saying that “the great 
cause is their want of a strong protecting government.”73 This “protection” was 
actually a guise for “oppression,” which characterized colonial rule and continued 
into post-colonial governance.  
Speke elaborated on his perception of the people he encountered in the region 
as inadequate to rule over the land: 
“This country being full of sweet springs, accounts for the denseness of the 
population and numberless heads of cattle. To look upon its resources, one is struck 
with amazement at the waste of the world: if instead of this district being in the hands 
of its present owners, it were ruled by a few scores of Europeans, what an entire 
revolution a few years would bring forth! An extensive market would be opened to 
the world, the present nakedness of the land would have a covering, and industry and 
commerce would clear the way for civilization and enlightenment.”74 
2. War of annexation 
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The European mission revolved around opening up space for trade, after 
industrialization in Europe necessitated new markets and new sources of raw material 
and manpower.
75
 Uganda would eventually supply England with cotton, coffee, tea, 
and other raw materials
76
 The market economy, however, was established on 
extremely unequal terms, extracting ivory, for example, at a minimum estimated 
profit of 1,500 to 2,000 percent.
77
  
What’s more, European explorers paved their way through violence, 
intimidation, and militarization. The colonialists controlled the population through 
taxes, confiscation of weapons, and forced recruitment of porters and labor. Baker 
claimed exclusive control over raw materials and considered anyone who failed to 
comply or pay taxes as hostile, and, therefore, a legitimate military target.
78
 Entire 
villages were destroyed in the effort to secure materials. In Baker’s own words: 
“The first steps in establishing the authority of a new government in a tribe hitherto 
savage and intractable were of necessity accompanied by military operations. War is 
from annexation, and the law of force, resorted to in self-defense, was absolutely 
indispensable to prove the superiority of the power that was eventually to govern. The 
end justified the means.”79 
 
The violence was considered legitimate for moral reasons, in effort to civilize 
the Africans through militarization. Baker believed that “if it were possible to convert 
the greater portion of African savages into disciplined soldiers, it would be the most 
rapid stride towards their future civilization…a savage who has led a wild and 
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uncontrolled life must first learn to obey authority before any great improvement can 
be expected.”80 
B. Reification and codification of Ugandan ethnic identities 
Ethnic belonging is about drawing boundaries and using differences and 
similarities or orient oneself within the world. However, “ethnic identity and culture 
are socially lived, and created and recreated in everyday life.”81 Ethnic identity cannot 
therefore be categorized into the pre-colonial and modern. The region known as 
Acholi-land was a contact zone for different stakeholders, of which the colonialists 
were the most influential. However, its forceful power was not strictly formative or 
final, but functioned on a continuum with pre-colonial and post-colonial occurrences. 
Acholi ethnic identity and other Ugandan ethnic identities were reified or codified 
because of colonialism, but Acholi collective belonging is not a colonial invention, 
imposed from above.
82
 
1. Colonial rhetoric 
Colonial rulers first created Gulu in 1910 and Chua in 1914, and later merged 
them into what was labeled as the Acholi district.
83
 They regarded themselves as 
instrumental in the formation of an overall ethnic belonging, helping them realize 
themselves as belonging to a nation or tribe:  
“The urgent trend of modern administration has been to bring the clans together and 
to make the Acholi conscious of their unity as a single people, without destroying 
their individualistic background. To this end the districts of Gulu (today’s Gulu and 
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Amuru) and Chua (today’s Kitgum and Pader) were amalgamated in 1937, when a 
unified Acholi district was formed with headquarters at Gulu: at the same time the 
Acholi Council, with seats not only for chiefs but for representatives of the people 
from all parts of the country, was brought into being. “84  
 
Colonial scholarship further encouraged systematic comparison between 
groups, categorized them into those like kingdoms with a centralized authority, and 
those without.
85
 The non-Bantu speaking people were defined by what they lacked. 
Postlethwaite, the pioneer colonial administrator of Acholiland said, “I became so 
discouraged by the absence of any real chiefs with definite, permanent tribal 
authority, that I found my mind turning for salvation to the old Buganda Agent policy 
of the Eastern Province of Uganda and, in fact, I actually installed one or two 
Banyoro as advisers to individual chiefs.”86 Postlethwaite notes that he was “dealing 
with a tribe who had no system of ancient holdings, nothing that answered to the 
Bataka (patrilineal clan heads) of…Buganda.”87 
The Bantu speaking Buganda kingdom of central Uganda, instead, was the 
“constant and normative point of reference”88 As colonial explorers had headed up 
from Buganda over the Nile into Acholiland they described “the tribes grew 
increasingly more primitive; they were back in a region of naked, painted men who 
carried bows and arrows and who knew nothing of the arts and crafts of Buganda.”89 
The arts and crafts of the Baganda were thought to be “far beyond the level attained 
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by neighboring peoples,”90 and both the religion and state reached a higher standard 
of development than other countries.
91
 These people eventually carried out much 
administration for the British in the areas outside of Buganda, serving as tax 
collectors and labor organizers and insisting on the exclusive use of their language 
(Luganda) and traditional dress.
92
  
The Acholi, on the other hand, were seen as lacking proper leadership but 
plenty suited to military recruitment. Postlethwaite, who recruited Acholi into the 
King’s African rifles during WWI, said that the Acholi took “to soldiering like ducks 
to water.”93 In this way, the colonized subjects were labeled as warlike, as in a 
“colonial mirror which reflects back onto the colonialists the barbarity of their own 
social relations, but as imputed to the savage or evil figures they wish to colonize.”94 
Missionaries also encouraged the production of texts that dealt with Acholi 
culture and history, compiling myths and histories and “promoting a higher degree of 
cultural coherence throughout Acholiland.”95 Missionary competition created 
divisions between Catholicism and Anglican Protestantism, with Catholicism taking 
the dominant position in Acholiland.
96
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2. Colonial practices 
In addition to colonial scholarship, colonial practices were influential in 
creating more rigid ethnic boundaries and divides, especially in that colonial rulers 
demonstrated a “concern for keeping the natives in the places they belong.”97 For 
instance, the market economy was to restrict interethnic movements. The products 
that had been exchanged in trade networks across the region could not compete with 
cheap goods mass produced in England.
98
 Furthermore, the prices of trading licenses 
and taxes were so high that European and Indian large business owners eventually 
replaced local traders.
99
 Development was also unevenly distributed between the two 
parts of the country, with the south securing railroad transport, cash crops, mission 
education, and the seat of government.
100
 By the time of independence, the 
northerners were seen as soldiers, civil servants were southerners, and merchants 
were Asians.  
Colonial practices furthermore demonstrated an ambition not to unite the 
Acholi for the sake a united Acholi nation, as they had claimed, but as a strategy to 
better administer the protectorate.
101
 For example, the majority of chiefs appointed by 
the British were commoners, not hereditary successors to precolonial chiefs, and they 
were only nominated if they were willing to cooperate with the administration.
102
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C. Neocolonial power struggles 
After independence, African leaders inherited infrastructures that were 
designed for economic extraction and lacking a tradition of accountability to the 
governed, so they perpetuated the generally anti-democratic and repressive measures 
and attitudes of their colonial predecessors. Regional and ethnic boundaries were 
manipulated and compounded by regimes scrambling for power all throughout 
Africa.  
Unlike most other colonial territories, Uganda achieved independence from 
Britain in 1962 without a struggle, because the British had set the stage for 
withdrawing before an effective nationalist movement could be organized.
103
 When 
Uganda achieved independence it was divided between its major kingdoms, of which 
the Baganda kingdom was most powerful. The independence constitution reflected 
the hierarchy of these different ethnic groups, granting federal status to the kingdom 
of Buganda, semi-federal status to the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, and 
district status to Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso 
and West Nile.
104
 
 The Baganda, whose population exceeded one million, whose territory 
covered most of the favored south, and whose people asserted superiority over their 
neighbors, best exemplified local nationalism in the newly independent state. 
“Subimperialism and Ganda cultural chauvinism” produced a legacy of resentment 
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and discord between the Baganda and its neighboring ethnic groups when they should 
have been working together to build a functioning independent state.
105
 
Milton Obote, the leader of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), was elected 
as the country’s first Prime Minister. Obote was faced with the challenge of meeting 
the demands of these divergent interest groups, especially of the Baganda and their 
kabaka, Mutessa II, who was designated to the ceremonial role of president and head 
of state. By 1966, the relationship between Obote and the kabaka deteriorated and 
Obote’s armed forces drove the kabaka out of his palace into exile in Britain. Obote 
then introduced a new constitution, which brought an end to the existence of the 
hereditary kingdoms, and declared himself the new executive president.
106
 
Obote wanted to implement a Common Man’s Charter full of anti-capitalist, 
anti-imperial, anti-feudal, and anti-tribal rhetoric.
107
 This “Move to the Left” was 
welcomed in the north as a move toward further decolonization because the colonial 
authority had favored the Baganda’s feudal model with a centralized sociopolitical 
organization, but the Baganda opposed it as chauvinistic and anti-Baganda.
108
 Obote’s 
military protégé, Idi Amin, whom he had relied on to maintain power by force, then 
gained enough support to overthrow him in 1971. He had support from British and 
Israeli forces, who quickly recognized him as the new head of state, as well as arms 
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and military technology supplied by global traders connected to companies in the US, 
UK, Soviet Union, and Libya.
109
  
With Obote and a small army of his supporters exiled in neighboring 
Tanzania, Amin appointed himself as the new president, and for eight years Uganda 
was subjected to his brutal military regime. Obote was from Langoland, bordering 
Acholiland in the north, and even though his ministers came from all over the 
country, he became associated with the whole Lango group and Acholi also because 
many of his security forces were Lango and Acholi. Amin, on the other hand, was 
from the West Nile region, and recruited people from that area to his armed forces. 
Amin specifically targeted the Acholi people of the north for their support of 
Obote,
110
 but anyone else who was considered a threat was in grave danger during 
Amin’s stay in power. He ordered mass killings of Acholi soldiers and executed many 
prominent Acholi politicians and intellectuals.
111
  
Support for Amin decreased significantly by 1978, when Tanzanian President 
Nyerere’s army joined with Obote’s army to overthrow Amin. The troops succeeded 
in expelling him to Saudi Arabia, but clashes between military leaders continued. The 
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violence of Amin’s regime was largely associated with West Nilers, so soldiers in 
Obote’s army took revenge on the people in that region, while pro-Amin insurgents 
were attacking from Congo and Sudan, compounding the violence in the West Nile 
region.
112
 
Yusuf Lule, academic and former principal of Makerere University, and the 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) established an interim government, but 
Lule was removed after only three months and replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, a 
member of Obote’s UPC.113 Other militias began to rapidly recruit members, leading 
to a military coup on May 10, 1980 led by Major General David Oyite Ojok, but also 
including Paulo Muwanga, chair of the Military Commission, Tito Okello, one of the 
commanders of Obote’s army, and current president Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.114  
As a result of rigged elections in 1980 Obote once again came into power, 
with Muwanga as vice president and minister of defense, but Museveni and his newly 
formed National Resistance Army (NRA) immediately launched a guerrilla war in the 
rural areas of Uganda to challenge him. Museveni took up arms because of the so-
called rigged elections, holding that there was an “absolute need to revolutionize 
Ugandan politics in the aftermath of Amin’s fall from power…because ‘the system’ 
that brought Obote back to power had been ‘created’ by the colonialists and ‘inherited 
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at independence.’ It was then ‘perfected’ by Obote in the 1960s and ‘matured’ under 
Amin’s rule.”115  
In the course of the next four years, Obote’s regime committed widespread 
atrocities in the counterinsurgency against Museveni’s NRA. The fighting took place 
primarily in the Luwero triangle of central Uganda. The Acholi were largely held 
responsible for the atrocities committed, and many people saw Museveni’s war as 
against a “regime of northerners, rather than the war for democracy that Museveni 
claimed it to be.”116 Witnesses before the Human Rights Commission described the 
army as Acholi even though they were from other places.
117
 
In 1985, Obote was overthrown by General Tito Okello and a group of 
soldiers, returning the country to military rule for less than a year until Museveni 
pushed his way to Kampala and took over in 1986. Museveni then implemented a 
four-year interim government with a “no-party” system that restricted political parties 
from entering candidates directly into elections. His government received widespread 
international support, and Uganda’s economy began to improve.118 However, his 
government in many ways followed the pattern of every other previous regime, 
clutching onto power at all cost, and demonizing and opting for the military response 
to opposition. Rather than ending the many years of fighting and oppression, then, 
Museveni’s takeover marked the beginning of several new conflicts in the north and 
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peripheral areas of Uganda, including the conflict with Joseph Kony and his LRA, 
which has continued up to this day.  
D. Legacy of violence and degradation 
 
Political history professor Mwangusa Ndebesa noted that, around the time of 
independence, the “seed of disunity was already there before 1962 among different 
ethnic communities.”119 He emphasized, however, that even with all those differences 
a unified nation could have been forged, except the State has “failed to shape the 
attitude and culture of Ugandans; those who have held state power have done it not 
because they wanted to use the State as an instrument for creating unity but to 
consolidate their power perpetually.”120 
When the Uganda People’s Congress’ Joseph Ochieno was asked to give an 
assessment of Uganda 47 years after independence, he also stated frankly that Uganda 
does not have a united, cohesive society at this point, and in many ways has 
regressed. “To use the popular term in town we have only had a change of guard in 
that we have an African at the helm in State House. Our economy is still largely 
controlled externally.”121 The general practice of the colonial authority was to control 
and contain the population through violence and degradation. In the same way today, 
even with the great strides Uganda has taken economically, the current government 
treats much of its population the same way as the imperialists from whom it achieved 
independence.  
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“What we see is a terrible legacy of colonialism. When client countries were 
seen as extended farms for the mother country, they had only one road leading to the 
port…We no longer have mother countries; we no longer have client countries, yet 
we have not developed a road network between ourselves. We kept our barriers.”122 
Ibrahim here is addressing the African regional economic institutions and their need 
to be integrated for moving forward in a global economy, but the spirit of his 
statement rings true all the way down to individual relationships within post-colonial 
Ugandan society. “We kept our barriers.”123 
1. Military action and war talk 
 
When Museveni took power in 1962, Obote’s and Okello’s soldiers fled to the 
north and launched the Uganda People’s democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A). As 
Museveni’s troops followed them northward their behavior deteriorated. “Killings, 
rape, and other forms of physical abuse aimed at noncombatants became the order of 
the day soon after the soldiers established themselves in Acholiland, which was 
foreign territory to them.”124 Before the war, cattle had been the Acholi’s most 
valuable commodity, but as a result of the army’s looting almost all of the cattle were 
                                                 
122 Mo Ibrahim, quoted in Africa: Viable Nations Depend on Integrating Economies, Says Business 
Leader, 5 October 2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200910050089.html. 
123 Id. 
124 Finnstrom, supra note 3, at 71: ROSALBA OYWA, IN ARMS TO FIGHT, ARMS TO PROTECT: WOMEN 
SPEAK OUT ABOUT CONFLICT (edited by Olivia Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Kitte Warnock, London: Panos, 
1995); Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, Kony’s message: A new Koine? The Lord’s Resistance 
Army in northern Uganda, 98 AFR. AFF, 390 (1999); Ogenga Otunnu, Causes and consequences of the 
war in Acholiland, in PROTRACTED CONFLICT ELUSIVE PEACE: INITIATIVES TO END THE VIOLENCE IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA (edited by Okello Lucima, London: Conciliation Resources and Kacoke Madit, 
2002); M. L. Pirouet, Human rights issues in Museveni’s Uganda, in CHANGING UGANDA: THE 
DILEMMAS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE (edited by Holder Bernt 
Hansen and Michael Twaddle, London: James Currey; Kampala: Fountain Press; Athens: Ohio 
University Press; Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya, 1991). 
  37 
lost. This destruction of wealth was so severe that people claimed it was worse than 
the Amin era.
125
 Amin had mostly targeted politicians, soldiers, and intellectuals, not 
ordinary people deep in the bush.  
As Dolan points out, “the Government’s failure to deal with the high levels of 
impunity enjoyed by the UPDF seemed to many people in northern Uganda to be an 
implicit authorization of that abuse, further proof that the Government shared in the 
devaluation of the Acholi.”126 As a result, there was widespread support for armed 
resistance, either directly or as the only perceived means of survival. Furthermore, 
Acholi soldiers from Uganda’s previous armies had a hard time reintegrating into 
rural life and being reconciled to their communities, and instead joined other rebel 
groups.  
The Ugandan government has favored the military option as the primary 
method of responding to resistance, but as Chris Dolan and others point out, the LRA 
could have been overcome by military means many years ago.
127
 The fact that they 
haven’t reflects the government’s lack of commitment to peace and its agenda for 
retaining control through violence. The government has also pursued these military 
operations alongside diplomatic efforts and negotiations, so that its diplomatic efforts 
have not aimed to deal conclusively with the LRA, but have instead proven to be a 
form of war talk, or “peace jokes.”128 For example, in the course of meetings between 
representatives of both the Government and the LRA during 1993 and 1994, an 
uneasy ceasefire was brought to a swift end when Museveni issued an ultimatum to 
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the rebels giving them seven days to retreat from the bush or be killed.
129
 Of course 
this led to a dramatic resurgence of violence within only a few days. 
Most recently, in 2006, a cessation of hostilities agreement was signed and a 
new round of peace talks took place in Juba, Sudan, culminating in a comprehensive 
settlement in March 2008.
130
 The Final Peace Agreement included eight substantive 
agreements, each signed by the leaders of the LRA and Ugandan government, but this 
time Kony failed to appear for the final signing of the cover Agreement in April, and 
has since refused to sign it while simultaneously initiating a new wave of attacks and 
abductions in northeastern Congo.
131
  
When the November deadline passed without Kony’s signature and 
international donor support for the peace process ran aground, the armies of Uganda, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and southern Sudan launched a joint military 
offensive in December called Operation Lightning Thunder.
132
 Unfortunately, even 
with the support of the United States, because of poor planning, insufficient logistical 
support, and too few U.N. peacekeepers and Congolese soldiers, this operation was 
largely a failure.
133
 It weakened the LRA, but did not succeed in apprehending any of 
its leaders. Also, it resulted in reprisal attacks on civilians that have killed around 500 
civilians in northeastern Congo and Southern Sudan, and displaced another 70,000, 
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bringing the total number of displaced in the area to over 100,000.
134
 Only 10 days 
after the launch of this operation the LRA retaliated in series of attacks on at least 
three villages, with the intent to “inflict that maximum number of deaths quickly by 
targeting gathered villages.”135 These attacks are known as the Christmas massacres.  
Operation Lightening Thunder demonstrated an unprecedented level of 
cooperation between the governments of the DRC, Uganda, and southern Sudan. It 
also has been said that if the US were to take the lead in supporting another military 
operation, taking greater responsibility for the execution and outcomes of the 
operation, apprehending Kony would be possible.
136
 A report by Enough, an 
American think tank, has maintained that the LRA’s “highly centralized hierarchy is 
one of the rebel group’s key weaknesses,”137 insisting that the atrocities will continue 
as long as Kony and other top commanders are at large. No matter how tricky it will 
be, they suggest a counterinsurgency targeted strictly at the leaders to avoid 
widespread civilian casualties.
138
 
However, that would not bring an end the conflict in the way many would 
hope. The focus on apprehending Kony militarily is essentially individualizing a very 
complex war into a reductionist explanation. It serves the government’s agenda to 
maintain power by diverting blame for the violence away from them, minimizing the 
issues that give rise to armed resistance in the first place. It also feeds into the agenda 
of western powers who see conflict as essentially boiling down to an individual, part 
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of the liberalist and modernist celebration of “the individual self as the locus of 
consciousness and experience,” but which fails because it “renders relations 
invisible—from personal relationships to transnational and global relations.”139 
Again, it diverts attention away from their role in the power relationships and 
structural circumstances that motivate such individuals to rebellion.  
2. Displacement and “protected villages” 
 
Government counterinsurgency tactics have also turned civilians into military 
targets for both government forces and the rebels. In 1991, for example, the 
government launched Operation North, which antagonized the LRA into maiming 
and killing hundreds of people assumed to be government collaborators.
140
 Further 
campaigns have been launched, culminating in Operation Iron Fist in 2002, and Iron 
Fist II in 2004. As a result of the first Iron Fist offensive, which intended to destroy 
the LRA by attacking their bases within Sudan, the LRA expanded the scale of it 
abductions, killings, and looting.
141
 As Human Rights reported, the army then 
responded by forcing people to move back into camps.
142
 
This pattern of military operations followed by LRA reprisals against citizens 
has characterized the conflict, and has contributed to the perception of the Acholi as 
“war-like.” It echoes the policies of the colonial administrator Samuel Baker, who in 
the effort to “civilize” through militarization, converted men in Acholiland into 
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soldiers who in turn “turned to gross abuse and violation of the local people” upon 
Baker’s departure.143 
The abuse and targeting of civilians by both sides of the conflict is best 
illustrated in the policy of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. The government 
began to forcefully resettle a large number of the population into camps, or “protected 
villages” as they were officially called, in 1996. At the height of the conflict in 2006, 
there were at least 1.8 million people in IDP camps.
144
 “Improvements in security 
have allowed some 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their 
areas of origin. However, as of June 2008, nearly 480,000 people were still living in 
camps.”145 
Part of the colonial policy was to control the movements of the different 
ethnic groups or “tribes” by creating districts. Many Acholi were forced into internal 
displacement during colonial rule, through a “policy of compulsorily moving large 
numbers of the population of Western Acholiland and concentrating them beside the 
main road.”146 The official reason was for evacuating areas where there had been 
sleeping sickness, but it was also admittedly for making the task of administration 
easier.
147
 
In the same way today, the forced resettlement of civilians into camps is not 
for the sole purpose of protecting the population, but a policy of control and 
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“enforced domination.”148 Talking about the Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Malkki sees 
the camp as a “technology of power” that helps “to constitute ‘the refugees’ as an 
object of knowledge and control.”149 It is also indicative of what Galtung described as 
“structural violence.”150 
“Under physical violence human beings are hurt somatically, to the point of 
killing. It is useful to distinguish further between ‘biological violence,’ which 
reduces somatic capability…and ‘physical violence as such,’ which increases 
the constraint on human movements—as when a person is imprisoned or put 
in chains, but also when access to transportation is very unevenly distributed 
keeping large segments of a population at the same place with mobility a 
monopoly of the selected few.”151 
 
The camps violate every major category of rights, and nearly all the UN’s 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
152
 In the camps people have been 
denied access to their land and, therefore, their livelihoods have been extremely 
compromised, as well as access to education, health services, and most basic rights of 
citizenship. They were established without due consultation with the people 
affected,
153
 lasted longer than required,
154
 failed to recognize peoples’ dependency on 
their land,
155
 failed to achieve basic standards of living in terms of shelter, water, 
food, sanitation, clothing, medical care,
156
 and denied them the right to “move freely 
in and out of camps or other settlements.”157 As Dolan puts it, what has passed for 
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‘protection’ in northern Uganda has in fact been a cover for violation and mass 
humiliation.
158
 
a) Organization 
The organization of the camp is such that the army detachment is stationed in 
the center of the camp, surrounded by the thousands of people the army is supposed 
to protect. Finnstrom documents the statements of people who said that to live in the 
camps is “to be a living shield (kwot) between two fighting forces.”159 The rebels 
often loot the camps after relief distributions, which they see as their fair share since 
the food aid is a consequence of their armed resistance in the first place.
160
 The camps 
have also been magnets for attacks from the LRA because they perceive the displaced 
population as supporters of the government, and the population has therefore become 
tactical targets in the LRA’s effort to establish control or exact revenge.  
The forced encampment has furthermore undermined traditional ways of 
organizing life.
161
 The camps were formed out of many villages crammed together 
into a single unit, which is fundamentally antithetical to Acholi patterns of settlement. 
Acholi settlement patterns are characterized by the “splitting off of sub-units from a 
village to go and establish new ones as a means of dealing with a fundamental 
tendency for a state of imbalance to be set up in the village.”162 
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b) Rebel collaborators 
The camps can be understood in terms of a military strategy to control and 
monitor potential rebel supporters, since in the eyes of the government, all Acholi are 
potential rebel collaborators.
163
 The army controls the camps, and civilians in the 
camps are often accused of being rebel collaborators and then ill-treated or 
tortured.
164
 HRW has documented cases of the army arresting and detaining people 
who are accused of being associated with the LRA, and use “ill-treatment and torture 
as methods of interrogation”165 According to the Uganda Human Rights 
Commission’s report for 2008, torture cases dominated the types of abuse reported to 
the commission, accounting for nearly 30% of the cases reported. An article in the 
New Vision notes that torture was allegedly used in an operation in the north to 
disarm people who illegally possessed firearms. Complaints against the army nearly 
doubled since 2007, and complaints against police were second only to private 
individuals.
166
 
Those, for example, who are found outside are often assumed to be rebels or 
rebel collaborators and may be shot or beaten to death. This happens frequently in 
certain areas when civilians breach the curfew, even if by only a few minutes. The 
local military battalion imposes a curfew on the civilian population; it sets a time by 
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which they have to return to the camp, and another time by which they have to be 
inside their huts.
167
  
Human Rights Watch reports that “the killings sometimes seem to be for no 
discernable reason—other than because the soldiers can do as they wish and later 
claim the civilians injured or killed were ‘rebel collaborators,’ whatever the 
circumstances.”168 
“Regardless of the presence of possible rebels or rebel collaborators inside displaced 
persons’ homes inside the camps, the UPDF has the duty to take all feasible 
precautions to protect the civilian population under its control against the effects of 
attacks. Soldiers carrying out an attack must be able to distinguish between legitimate 
military targets and civilians. Shooting into huts inside displaced persons camps 
where there was no apparent rebel activity is an indiscriminate use of force in 
violation of the laws of war.  The summary execution of any person is a war 
crime.”169 
People have also reported being held in pits or in barracks for prolonged 
periods, and very few receive a trial.
170
 Those held in this way are being denied their 
right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.
171
 There is no basis in the law for 
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the army to detain people unless it is in the context of the battlefield, and even those 
captured must be turned over to the authorities for criminal prosecution. However, 
HRW has interviewed many people who were not captured on the battlefield and 
have been held in military detention without an opportunity to see or challenge the 
evidence against them.
172
 
c) Sexual violence 
Civilians also have not been protected against “rape, mutilation, torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other outrages upon personal 
dignity, such as acts of gender-specific violence, forced prostitution, or any form of 
indecent assault.”173 In many conflicts sexual violence is used as a tactic for 
terrorizing people and gaining power over them. It “destroys the very fabric of society 
and breaks down the ties that hold communities together,” and, therefore, “it is used 
as a tool in these conflicts to intimidate, humiliate, destroy and captivate enemy 
populations.”174  
In Uganda, both the LRA and the Ugandan government have employed sexual 
violence as a means of terrorizing and gaining power. Young girls are raped and 
forced to be the sex slaves, or “wives,” of LRA leaders,175 and Kony himself is said to 
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have had up to 50 girls in his household at a time.
176
 A report by UNICEF in 2005 
found rape to be the most common form of violence in the Pabbo IDP camp in 
Gulu.
177
 Because of the lack of discipline and accountability within the army, women 
are especially vulnerable to abuse by soldiers and others in the community. Soldiers 
often attack women and girls when they are outside the camps collecting firewood or 
water or tending to crops.  Abuse is compounded when UPDF boosts its presence in 
an area where there has been an increase LRA activity. HRW documented how the 
“extra protection” in Kitgum Matidi camp in 2004 resulted in many women getting 
raped.
178
 
E. Discourse and the dominant narrative of the war 
1. Peripheral and irrational 
Uganda is widely held by academics and international organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund as a “success story of reconstruction, structural 
adjustment, and economic liberalization.”179 In the dominant discourse about the 
conflict, it is portrayed as peripheral to the country’s development and success.  
The north and the Acholi have been blamed for Uganda’s violent past, and the 
colonial stereotype of the Acholi as warriors has been used to generate more fear and 
mistrust. “In Museveni’s war propaganda, the enemy was alleged to be northerners in 
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general and Acholi in particular.”180 In one public speech Museveni allegedly evoked 
the metaphor of the Acholi as grasshoppers in a bottle, where they will eat one 
another before they find the way out through the bottleneck.
181
 Museveni calls the 
rebels “hyenas” from time to time, portraying them as “wild creatures, which in many 
African cosmologies means that they have vitality and power, but more, that they 
represent the uncultured wilderness, danger, depredation, death, sorcery, and 
witchcraft.”182 He also calls the rebels “criminals” and “murderers” and denies the 
political dimension to the conflict by referencing their alleged use of “mysticism 
instead of science,” “witchcraft,” and “backwardness.”183 
This reflects the kind of perception of Acholi as violent and war-like, and 
culturally backward, and has led to gross mistreatment of the Acholi people. For 
example, “it appears that NRA soldiers were repeatedly told that the Acholi were the 
enemies, so when the NRA arrived in Acholiland, they first behaved well, but soon 
begun to destroy Acholiland systematically.”184  
Allen describes how the war in the north has actually had certain political 
advantages for Museveni’s government.185 Most of the fighting has taken place in the 
north where he has no power base, and “the horrific violence and weird spirituality of 
the LRA allowed his government to present the north as a kind of barbaric 
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periphery.”186 In this way Museveni presents himself has the protector of the great 
south, or at the very least the best alternative to the Acholi and violent northerners. 
The government is portrayed as protecting its own citizens, and the LRA violence 
receives considerably more attention while the Ugandan army elevates itself as the 
rational and modern party to the conflict.
187
  
In a recent speech at the first East Africa Community (EAC) Peace and 
Security Conference, Museveni emphasized that outside forces that led to 
colonization were the greatest threats to Africa, not “small groups” like the 
Interahamwe or Kony’s LRA. “These are not the real dangers to Africa.” His 
assertion is that these groups are “colonial residues” that would be defeated.188 This 
kind of talk and representation of the rebels make comprehensive peace talks 
difficult. The rebels oppose the Ugandan government’s hierarchical system of 
approach to the conflict, in which government leaders are promoted as the superior 
party, “the ones to forgive the inferior party.”189 
Museveni’s rhetoric has also continued to assert that Ugandans are not mature 
enough for multiparty politics.
190
 Juxtaposed with the common label by local political 
and religious leaders of the rebels as “children in the bush” who are encouraged to 
“come out from the bush,” because the war is “useless,” the bias is clearly that the 
conflict is between Acholi parents and their children in the bush. The LRA is said to 
be “led by self-proclaimed mystic Joseph Kony whose guerrillas spread terror 
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through their Acholi communities, attacking civilians, kidnapping tens of thousands 
of children to serve as soldiers and ‘wives,’ and slicing the lips and noses off their 
victims.”191A common description is that “the mysterious LRA is notorious for 
mutilating victims and abducting children — forcing the boys to fight and the girls to 
become rebels' concubines.”192 In this way the war is portrayed as the LRA against its 
own people and therefore irrational. 
2. A war on, and with, and against children 
The conflict is often represented as primarily fought by abducted children. 
Typical estimates of child abductions are that “nearly 90% of LRA fighters are 
enslaved children – nearly 6,000 are still missing and it is not known whether they are 
dead or alive.”193 World Vision claims that 10,000 children were abducted in 2002 
alone,
194
 but it is not clear where this figure came from, or how many are still with the 
LRA. Chris Dolan, on the other hand, based on statistics from reception centers in 
Gulu up to 2002, found that the number of children remaining with the LRA was “at 
the very most around 900.”195 
While child abductions are a horrendous tactic employed by the LRA, 
children are not the primary source of manpower for the rebel forces. UNICEF 
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conducted a survey of all abductions and found that between 1990 and 2001, almost 
28,903 people had been taken from Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac, and Lira districts.
196
 
Less than 10,000, or a third of the total reported abductions, were children, and 77% 
of those 10,000 abducted children returned home within a year and another 15.9% the 
following year.
197
 The pattern and scale of child abduction has changed over the 
years, but it has never been the only form of recruitment into the LRA. The war is 
not, as the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland has 
said, “a war on, and with, and against children.”198 
The picture of the rebel group as primarily composed of children is 
problematic in that it fuels the perception of LRA irrationality and ignorance, as well 
as implying that combatants are not accountable for their participation, since they are 
abducted and traumatized children. The abduction of children, however, has been a 
deliberate strategy to systematically terrorize the population, as is the targeted killing 
of children and babies. Indoctrinating and forcing children to do horrible things, 
especially kill members of their own family, “inverts the moral order” and 
demonstrates the power of the LRA.
199
  
3. Exclusively religious and ethnic in nature 
The religious dimension of the conflict attracts more attention because of the 
gross violence and human rights abuses perpetrated by the rebels, which has been 
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motivated in terms of religion and morality. The colonial effort to justify by moral 
reasons the process of civilizing Africans through militarization has shaped the 
motivation and rhetoric of both the Ugandan government and LRA in their efforts to 
secure power and advance civilization in Uganda. The imperialist powers appealed to 
religion and morality to legitimate the colonial expansion. Now, both the Ugandan 
government and the LRA have appealed to religion to justify not explaining 
themselves. 
For the LRA, a “claim to a new moral order provides them with the legitimacy 
to abduct children into their ranks…motivation to mutilate or even kill people.”200 
Kony justifies LRA atrocities by saying “if you picked up an arrow against us and we 
ended up cutting off the hand you used, who is to blame? You report us with your 
mouth, and we cut off your lips. Who is to blame? It is you! The Bible says that if 
your hand, eye or mouth is at fault, it should be cut off.”201  
In the 1994 peace talks, “the LRA said they were guided by the Holy Spirit 
and, therefore, beyond question.” However, true Biblical teaching emphasizes that 
being filled with the Holy Spirit leads to humility and submitting to one another out 
of love and reverence for Christ.
202
 The government, on the other hand, said “they 
were guided by the Bible verse which indicates that Government authority is God-
given – and that the LRA should therefore not question them.”203  
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This statement also reflects an attitude of superiority, which a true Biblical 
understanding does not support. An appeal to Biblical authority is only legitimate 
when references are understood within the full context of history and moral teaching. 
This government representative was quoting from the Apostle Paul’s letter to the 
Romans, in which he exhorts people to “be in subjection to the governing authorities, 
for there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by 
God.”204 This is no small text; it is a great theme of God’s sovereignty over the 
establishment and disestablishment of every government in the world today and 
throughout history.  
The point Paul is making here and elsewhere is to submit to the civil authority 
out of reverence for God, not the ruler. They are not God; God is God.
205
 It is for the 
good of people to have a civil authority rather than everyone doing what is right in 
their own eyes. This authority should not be a “terror to good conduct, but to bad,”206 
which is defined by the moral law of God. The authority exists as “a minister of God 
to you for good.”207 Paul wanted the Roman authorities who would read this letter to 
see that God and His moral law have ultimate authority, but that Christians are not 
revolutionaries against Caesar’s throne; Christians are harmless lovers of lost and 
hurting people who will actually do much good in the empire. Furthermore, he is 
saying that humility and self-denial are much more important than how we are treated 
by anyone, which carries implications for the attitudes of individual members of 
society and also for the government, which is composed of individuals. Consider that 
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earlier in that same letter to the Romans from which the Ugandan government 
extracted their “God given authority,” Paul exhorts people to “not be haughty in 
mind, but associate with the lowly. Do not be wise in your own estimation. Never pay 
back evil for evil to anyone.”208  
Museveni continues to reference Biblical scripture to air his ambivalence 
toward peace negotiations. When an Amnesty Act was introduced in 2000 for all 
rebels, he said that he didn’t believe in it, and instead suggested “we should apply the 
law of Moses; an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, to bring discipline to society.”209 
From statements like this, human rights organizations conclude in reports that the war 
is rooted in ethnic mistrust and religious beliefs, but don’t address other dimensions 
of the conflict. It’s true that religion and ethnicity play a very powerful role, but less 
as the source of conflict and more as a weapon of war. In the same way that religion 
is employed as a shallow platform for the parties to the conflict to advance their 
agenda and legitimize their actions, both sides have capitalized on ethnic belonging 
and stereotypes.  As Finnstrom aptly describes, “stereotypes of dominant traditions 
and fixed categories become the shorthand that mask other, more complex social 
realities.”210 
Insiders in Museveni’s nonparty movement describe the Acholi as a “military 
democracy.”211 One scholar says that because of their recruitment into the King’s 
African Rifles during colonization, eventually the Acholi found solidarity in their 
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“militarized ethnicity,”212 and with the Acholi as “the military aristocracy of the 
north,” Uganda was divided along “primordial lines.”213 He continues by pointing out 
that “what matters from the point of view of the colonial genesis of ‘tribalism’ is the 
simple fact that a broad new Acholi political consciousness became superimposed 
over the narrower parochialisms of the sub-units of the Acholi.”214  
It’s true that the colonial politics of ethnification were in fact an avenue of 
anticolonialism.
215
 Finnstrom notes that “just as ethnic codification was a primary 
means through which the colonial power of indirect rule tried to keep its control, so 
ethnic belonging was to become one of the main ways of protesting against the very 
same control.”216 However, Mazrui’s conclusion that the Acholi ultimately took on 
this idea of being a “military ethnocracy” is narrow and reduces people to “passive 
objects of imposed change.”217 
Dolan notes how the recruitment and abduction of new combatants to the 
LRA was intended to help incorporate non-Acholi into a whole new Acholi 
community.
218
 Dolan describes the ‘New Acholi’ identity as a sort of mythologized 
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‘Old’ Acholi, cleansed of the corruption of westernizing influences.219 In practice, 
though, Kony has failed to break away from the ethnic divisions in his organization. 
Many of those who voluntarily joined the LRA have had their own political agendas 
and were, therefore, frustrated by the extreme degree of control and ethnicized 
command structure.
220
 
The idea of belonging and exclusion has been “integral to the LRA’s demands 
for recognition and validation, and to the Government’s refusal to give it.”221 A 
government official during the 1994 peace talks described them as ‘local,’ an attitude 
very much reminiscent of Uganda’s colonial predecessors, who reluctantly 
condescended themselves to engage with the ‘natives’ who were “both morally and 
physically, little better than brutes.”222 The term ‘local’ is heavily loaded in the 
context of the severe under-development characterizing northern Uganda. It connotes 
the idea of something not being ‘up-to-date,’ or being an unofficial or second-rate 
substitute for ‘the real thing.’223  
It also goes back to such practices as the election of chiefs during the colonial 
administration, which were heavily influenced by the British administrators, so that 
individuals who were willing to cooperate with the administration were nominated at 
a much higher rate than hereditary chiefs of the precolonial kingdoms.
224
  In the 
words of one colonial administrator: “In the first place must be put the fact that an 
inherited capacity to ‘make rain’ and to carry out other traditional functions did not 
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necessarily also ensure possession of those qualities which make a sound 
administrator, tax collector or magistrate.”225 Now in a similar way, the Ugandan 
constitution dictates that the chiefly offices are titular only, and don’t have any 
administrative, legislative, or executive powers.
226
 
4. Humanitarian, not political 
However the LRA is portrayed, though, whether as a spiritual group, as 
terrorists, as rebels or criminals, the fact is that they do articulate a political agenda, 
one that could even be seen as representing Acholi grievances. The media portrays 
the LRA rebels as fighting for the sole purpose of ruling the country on the basis of 
the Ten Commandments.
227
 However, they have published at least three manifestos, 
in 1996, 1998, and 1999, expanding on a number of political objectives: 
“Restoration of multi-party politics; introduction of constitutional federalism; 
promotion of human rights; development of nation wide economic balance; 
establishment of nation wide peace and security; ending corruption; free and fair 
elections; good international relations with neighbors; separation of the military from 
the judiciary and executive arm of government; and reforming parliament to empower 
it to deal with ‘critical, political and economic issues of the country.’”228 
 
In the eyes of the world, though, the conflict is still seen as humanitarian, not 
political. NGOs, donors, churches, media, and the UN are all seen as external actors, 
responding to the situation rather than having a generative role.
229
 After Jan Egeland 
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said “northern Uganda must be one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world,” it 
has been commonly referred to in the media as “the most forgotten crises in the 
world.”230 
In a recent visit to the Acholi region when the Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian affairs John Holmes attended the African Union Special Summit on 
Refugees, Returnees and IDPs, he stressed that “Humanitarian, recovery and 
development actors must redouble their commitment to working with the government 
and people of Uganda to help the most vulnerable members of the displaced 
population return to their homes, and to ensure that those who have already returned 
have the basic services they need.”231 He went on to describe the challenges for the 
some 500,000 who have not been able to return home from the IDP camps due to age, 
disability, illness, or impediments to land rights and ownership.
232
  
The article was then characteristically topped off by pointing to the “cause” of 
the displacement: “The LRA, which terrorized northern Uganda for two decades, has 
been accused of committing atrocities including mutilations and the recruitment of 
child soldiers.”233 This prevailing understanding of the conflict as at the hands of a 
rebel group with no legitimate agenda other than to terrorize, and in the hands of 
external humanitarian actors to help the government protect its citizens, completely 
undermines the responsibility of the government itself for it’s role in perpetuating the 
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conflict, and the humanitarian actors for being complicit in government policies that 
control, contain, and oppress the population. 
Although relief has been promoted as detached from the local reality and 
therefore neutral and nonpartisan, the humanitarian regime has been entangled in the 
practices and politics of the war, operating essentially as “local administrators” for 
the Ugandan government.
234
 This has led to high levels of mistrust among the 
displaced people, and increased violence against them by the rebels. It has also 
resulted in an economy of dependency among the displaced population, which only 
serves the government’s ambition to control and contain them. 
A particular NGO intervention deserves attention for its perpetuation of 
misguided stereotypes and shortsighted solutions: The creation of “demonstration” 
plots to teach improved agricultural techniques, such as the World Vision-USAID 
Food Security Project. The World Vision program in Gulu and Kitgum produced 
beans and maize that were sold to the WFP for relief distribution to Sudanese 
refugees. By promoting this “example that will lead to self-sustainability” and 
“development that will help building peace and understanding in the north and in 
Uganda,”235 they were implying that “people’s impoverishment is their own fault – if 
only they knew how to farm properly they would be self-reliant.”236 
In fact, the problem for these people was not a lack of agricultural skills but 
access to their land. “NGOs’ emphasis on teaching people how to survive on very 
little land, rather than helping them to get back onto the land they already knew how 
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to manage suggested an underlying ‘modernization’ agenda, and a preparedness to 
sanction de facto land alienation.”237  
The government recently proposed another idea of giving tractors to displaced 
persons who have returned to their villages, in order to meet the intended three acres 
per household goal for cultivation in the next planting season.
238
 However, the 
returnees responded by pointing out that tractors that consume fuel and break down 
do not empower people, rather they should be given ox-ploughs, which are cost 
effective and practical for the impoverished.
239
 This type of development proposal is 
characteristic of the externally imposed development programs that serve the interests 
of the donors but don’t actually meet the needs of the community. 
F. The marginalized north 
 
Regional divisions were a central issue in the national politics after 
independence. “What opposition groups in the north and east of the country have in 
common is not ethnic identity or cultural traditions, but a history of being only 
peripherally included in the economic structures and processes of the country.”240 The 
colonial divisions of labor emerged and cemented themselves in the post-
independence state. Labor was recruited from the north, while most of the 
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development and social services like education and hospitals were concentrated in 
central Uganda, and efforts to expand have not been successful.
241
 
Today the north is one of the poorest areas of the country, and the war is 
posed as an obstacle to northern development. 63% population lives below the 
poverty line, compared to the national average of 38%.
242
 “Inequitable development 
makes the country more vulnerable to ills like conflict and HIV/Aids and therefore is 
a burden in achieving national progress,” said UN Resident Coordinator for Uganda, 
Mr. Theophane Nikyema, in his message to mark the World Day for the Eradication 
of Poverty.
243
 “Statistics show that northern Uganda is the worst performing region in 
terms of development indices and poverty prevalence. This makes the region more 
vulnerable but also a development burden.”244 At least 17 million people don’t have 
access to food compared to 12 million in 1992.
245
 The northern and eastern areas of 
Uganda are most affected by food insecurity because of the war.
246
 
A recent Uganda Bureau of Statistics report titled, “Spatial trends of poverty 
and inequality in Uganda 2002-2005,” shows that the proportion of Ugandans still 
living in absolute poverty is 31 percent, about 9 million people, with the majority of 
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these found in the east and northern regions.
247
 This, however, according to the 
report, is an improvement from the 39 per cent of people who were living in abject 
poverty in 2002. The report shows that distribution of the decline was particularly 
skewed to the urban areas and sub counties in the central and western regions, while 
in the north and north eastern sub-regions, the poverty levels remained particularly 
severe, with levels standing at 64.8 percent compared to 40 per cent in the eastern 
region and 19.3 percent in the western region.
248
  
The impoverishment of displaced persons, among other factors, has caused a 
breakdown in social values. As a result of poverty, child abuse was ranked next to 
torture in the number of complaints to the Uganda Human Rights Commission in 
2008, including the failure of parents to take care of their children.
249
 Also, soldiers 
are often the “richest” people in area because they receive regular income. As one 
community leader put it, “Soldiers are often the only ones in the camps with money. 
They can entice young girls, even married women, into sex.”250 Parents sometimes 
complain that soldiers have “defiled” their children, many younger than sixteen.251 
The socio-economic collapse of the north is such that: “Despite the 
humanitarian assistance they have received…the overall picture is one of severe 
destitution: of a population accustomed over generations to a situation of relative self-
reliance and even prosperity that has been reduced to dependency, idleness and 
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debilitating uncertainty with respect to what the future may hold for them and their 
children.”252 
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IV. Mechanisms for building peace 
A. No peace without justice 
The pursuit of justice cannot be divorced from the pursuit of peace, for in fact 
justice is an integral part of peace; they are not mutually exclusive, but mutually 
reinforcing. The understanding of peace as shalom, an ideal webbing together of 
people, leads to and understanding of justice as sharing and investing what everyone 
has into the lives of everyone else, to build up a strong flourishing community. The 
imperialist mission essentially dissolved all social cohesion by extracting wealth and 
imposing racist ideologies, securing control at all costs to the colonized subjects. 
Ugandan’s continue to pay the price as successor governments have carried on this 
legacy of superiority and violence. The path to peace requires an overhaul in the way 
that leaders engage with their citizens and rebels engage with their neighbors, not 
fueled by selfish ambition and desperately holding onto power by grinding down the 
population, but by earning the right to lead and empowering society.  
“For justice to be done in a way which supports victims, builds peace, and 
reduces impunity, the mechanisms have to be owned by the beneficiaries.
253
 A 
transitional justice policy must reflect the will of the community while meeting 
international human rights law standards. The mechanisms need to be negotiated, in 
the same way a development project is owned by the beneficiaries who are actively 
involved in the design and implementation of the project. Failure to involve and 
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represent the community leaves you “with boreholes which are abandoned at the first 
mechanical failure,” says Chris Dolan, describing how “justice mechanisms are no 
different to boreholes. If they are to be sustainable and to make a contribution to 
sustainable and positive peace, then they must involve local ownership.”254 Along the 
same line is the idea of giving returnees tractors to cultivate the land that require fuel 
and mechanical repair rather than ox-ploughs which are customary and sustainable 
for the people. Those kinds of investments don’t actually help the community, 
because they are not locally owned.  
For a justice system to resonate with the community and promote national 
unity, it must aim to rebuild or reconstruct institutions that are conducive to a stable 
and fair political system, as well as channel economic resources in such a way as to 
meet this end. In this way the community must be fully represented, adequately 
addressing the needs of all those affected or it will create divisions and generate 
future conflicts. 
B. No justice without truth  
Justice must contribute to individual healing and link individual with 
community experiences of violence, which establishes a relationship between the 
delivery of justice and psycho-social healing. To contribute to individual healing, the 
truth must be known and officially acknowledged.
255
 Truth-telling is a pre-requisite 
for reconciliation because it is necessary for the restoration of social order and broken 
relationships. It encourages healing because even where there is no legal option for 
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redress, spelling out what has happened and understanding how it has affected people 
is critical to process of healing. It is not a product to be handed over for a nation to 
heal, rather it’s a profound experience of confronting history and building a shared 
narrative as a foundation on which to build the country’s future.  
1. Truth and forgiveness 
The act of truth telling is not sufficient by itself; the offender needs to take 
responsibility, there needs to be restitution for the offense, and there needs to be a 
safe atmosphere for emerging stories. Society must be open to bearing the painful 
details of the abuse and atrocities committed, and forgiving those individuals who 
have acted as perpetrators. Forgiveness incurs a cost to the victim, but is necessary for 
the inclusion of individuals who have become outcasts because of their role as 
perpetrators in the conflict. 
For example, formerly abducted children are considered “morally tainted” 
after the things they have been exposed to in the bush.
256
 They feel judged and 
abandoned, since neighbors and other people avoid them. People hold that former 
combatants have cen in their head that will affect the wider surroundings. Cen is the 
spirits of people who have died violently, and can be translated as “vengeance ghost” 
or “troublesome spirit.”257 The idea is that people who witness violence or experience 
violence in war can be disturbed, start behaving “asocially, amorally, and eventually 
in violent and destructive ways.”258 
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These children often end up on the streets and survive by employing the 
patterns of illicit and violent behavior they learned with the LRA. They blame their 
behavior on the harsh conditions they face in their daily life without getting support 
from their communities.
259
 The community steps in by calling on the police, who 
respond by rounding them up off the streets and shuffling them through a rehab center 
before returning them to their relatives. However, a rehabilitation officer in Gulu said 
that families regard children who have been abducted by the LRA and have 
committed crimes as “outcasts,” and it is therefore hard to take them home once 
they’ve been through the rehabilitation center.260 The relatives won’t accept them 
after the crimes they’ve committed. 
To foster an atmosphere of reconciliation and encourage forgiveness, non-
legal strategies might be as effective as legal ones and may even be more successful 
in this case.
261
 As Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf observes, “forgiveness flounders 
because I exclude my enemy from the community of humans even as I exclude 
myself from the community of sinners.”262 Mutual forgiveness is critical for 
reconciliation, and only possible outside of the government’s and international 
community’s hierarchical approach to dealing with the rebels, reflected in the system 
of punitive justice and pattern of military operations. Traditional justice mechanisms 
provide a legitimate avenue for forgiveness to take place in a community because 
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they manifest equality and shared humanity. They take place on neutral ground 
between both victim and perpetrator, an all parties genuinely step out to admit and 
take responsibility for their wrongdoings. In this way, personal responsibility is 
encouraged and accountability expanded to the whole community.  
Particularly in Acholi ritual ceremonies, participation is voluntary and 
therefore non-confrontational, using social pressure and spiritual beliefs as incentives 
rather than the fear of law. These mechanisms give both the victim and perpetrator an 
active role in the process, creating an atmosphere of openness and accountability in a 
complicated situation of protracted impunity and where it’s difficult to distinguish 
between victim and perpetrator. 
Traditional and religious leaders, largely in collaboration with international 
aid agencies, have been advocating for collective mato oput ceremonies. Mato oput, 
is a social reconciliation ceremony for after a killing, whereby the wrongdoer admits 
responsibility, asks for forgiveness, and pays compensation. It has been generalized 
and romanticized, though, to “become a sort of euphemism for healing rites or 
blessings performed by the rwodi moo (anointed chiefs), which promote reintegration 
of former LRA combatants into society by offering ‘forgiveness.’”263 The concept of 
mato oput is not unique to the region, and was never part of any pre-colonial legal 
code.
264
 However, it’s useful as a form of social healing, to re-establish social 
relations, hierarchies, and shared moral norms. 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have also been a successful model for 
exploring root causes of conflict and ending the “mythology of lies” perpetuated by 
the former states of South Africa and Sierra Leone.
265
 A full investigation of the 
conflict in Uganda, with public hearings, could also then help to provide a complete 
picture of the nature, causes, and extent of human rights violations in the country 
since Museveni came to power in 1986. It would be equally open to individuals on 
both sides of the conflict, both in the government and the LRA, and it could be 
combined with punitive justice mechanisms for those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, modeled in part after the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
2. Truth and responsibility 
One of the advantages to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as 
ritual ceremonies, is that it encourages both forgiveness and accountability. Ignoring 
accountability only deepens impunity and perpetuates violence, because where there 
is a perception of past injustices going unpunished, violence usually recurs. Stephan 
Rapp, U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues said in remarks to the state 
department that “it is critical that human rights violators, such as those who commit 
rape as a tactic of war, be held responsible for their crimes if such practices are to 
stop…If you don’t hold people to account for these kind of offenses, they’ll be 
repeated. This will be a tool, a technique to intimidate the population, in order to keep 
people in power, in order to gain power.”266  
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Since the Nuremburg tribunals after World War II, the dominant view has 
favored the criminal justice option for responding to human rights violations. 
However, international criminal justice with its narrow focus on prosecutions is just 
one part of the broad scope of requirements for positive and sustainable peace.  
The International Criminal Court, in particular, was created in 1998 as an 
independent institution with jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and eventually, the crime of aggression.
267
 The list of crimes in 
its Statute is more extensive than in any other individual treaty outlining the laws of 
war, “covering virtually every breach of the Conventions and Protocol I.”268 The 
Statute also makes express reference to a State or organizational policy to commit 
crimes against humanity,
269
 recognizing the “unprecedented capacity of contemporary 
insurgencies and terrorist groups to commit large scale atrocities against civilians.”270 
The Court’s first case came when President Museveni referred the situation 
concerning the LRA in December 2003.
271
 
The Court has jurisdiction for crimes committed only since the Statute was 
entered into force on July 1, 2002,
272
 but, in 2005, the Prosecutor’s investigation 
resulted in a wealth of evidence from those few years to justify issuing arrest warrants 
for the top five leaders of the LRA. None of these men have been apprehended since 
the warrants were unsealed in 2005, but some have argued that the warrants helped 
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create the pressure needed to bring the LRA to the negotiating table.
273
 It could 
equally be argued that the (albeit faint) possibility that the ICC might extend its 
investigations into Government abuses in northern Uganda helped to persuade the 
GoU to engage seriously in peace talks.
274
 
The Court intervention has sparked heated debates about the relationship 
between peace, justice, and impunity, and even the nature of justice itself within a 
post-colonial African State.
275
 In the debate surrounding the ICC, a number of 
overlapping reservations have been raised, including that the ICC is biased, or that it 
will exacerbate the violence, ignore local justice mechanisms, and undermine the 
peace process.
276
 
The Prosecutor intends to secure convictions and, therefore, needs to establish 
a clear pattern of crimes and a line of command.
277
 He is limited then by the Court’s 
jurisdictional mandate, which dates only back to 2002, not far enough to investigate 
all of the government’s activities. The government has been sensitive to its reputation, 
and has been more legitimately engaged in the peace process since inviting the 
spotlight on the country in 2003. Since referring the situation with the LRA to the 
Court, the government has adjusted many of its policies. Although, as Human Rights 
Watch has documented, Museveni's military continue to commit serious human rights 
abuses.
278
 The Court’s response to requests for investigations into these abuses was 
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that “the alleged crimes perpetrated by the Ugandan government were not grave 
enough to reach the threshold.”279 
The main problem with the ICC’s involvement is that any path toward 
peaceful resolution of the conflict must include the government taking responsibility 
for its role in killing, looting, destroying, and committing other crimes against its 
citizens in the north ever since 1986. The Court’s arbitrary mandate and gravity 
threshold don’t allow for an avenue to peace in this way. Its role in exacting 
retributive justice does not facilitate an understanding of the embedded political, 
historical, and structural conditions that have caused and exacerbated the conflict. 
There are social injustices in the everyday lives of people, interfering with their 
access to land, wealth, humanity and dignity, which must be addressed before peace 
will be achieved. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights Judge Navi Pillay 
argues, “where societies are destroyed by cataclysmic war and mass crimes, while 
prosecutions are one mechanism to deal with the individual crimes, in the aftermath 
of war there is a great moral vacuum which the law alone cannot fill.”280 
3. Truth and restitution 
The effectiveness of transitional justice can be measured by the reparative 
measures, which are a sign of good faith and the government’s genuine intention to 
include the Acholi within the country equally as citizens. The Acholi prefer 
compensation and reconciliation to revenge when dealing with disputes and deaths, 
because vengeance perpetuates violence while compensation maintains order. 
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Farming land is a valuable resource in Uganda, and a highly charged issue in 
the discourse surrounding compensation. Colonial settlers seized huge tracts of the 
most fertile land for themselves, and senior politicians since independence have taken 
land for favors and patronage. Military figures as well have taken advantage of the 
war to grab land belonging to IDPs. 
For many, then, the return home from IDP camps has been fraught with land 
disputes and allegations of land grabbing. Because the system of land ownership is 
communal in the sense that outside urban areas people do not hold individual land-
titles, it is hard for individuals to reclaim plots they once owned. The government, 
furthermore, has refused to compensate people for property destroyed during the war, 
calling the idea “sheer madness.”281 For people to return home voluntarily and with 
dignity, however, they will need a form of material assistance from the government. 
A 2007 survey by land experts in Acholi and Lango regions showed that 73% of 
respondents who lost resources want compensation.
282
 In 2009 study of IDPs exiled 
in Kampala, “respondents frequently linked the need for reparations, their individual 
ability to move forward in life, and the community’s overall well-being.”283 
In a study on the perspectives of urban IDPs in Kampala, respondents held the 
government at least in part responsible for the conflict, either through failing to 
protect them or actively “encouraging” rebellion to eliminate the Acholi people as a 
political threat.
284
 Respondents wanted the government to pay reparations, but 
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acknowledged the challenges of calculating the appropriate amount, and the potential 
for corruption in the process of dissemination. They were also likely to demand the 
return of their cattle lost during the conflict, since cattle are perceived as crucial to the 
Acholi way of life and agricultural production. They seemed to most want assistance 
in returning home, though, alongside “developmental measures and an official 
apology by both the LRA and the government.”285 This is not surprising, considering 
the untenable state of uncertainty and exile to which they have become accustomed.  
C. Institutional reform 
There are many areas of public policy that can and need to be addressed to 
reverse the marginalization and oppression of segments of Uganda, which in turn 
have fueled armed resistance and protracted conflict. An area of law that serves as an 
illustration of the type of changes that will need to take place is the treatment of 
displaced persons. IDPs are not protected under international law like refugees who 
have crossed an international border. However, as the experiences of the population 
in northern Uganda vividly illustrate, “displacement not only violates an individual's 
dignity but can also amount to a violation of their human rights, including inter alia 
their rights to life, shelter, food, an adequate standard of living, property, equality, 
and non-discrimination. It also often exposes the most vulnerable among them, 
women and children in particular, to illness, destitution, exploitation, gender-based 
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violence, and forcible recruitment into armed groups.”286 The policy of camps in 
Uganda has provided ample evidence for these types of violations. 
Recently, African leaders met at the Special Summit of the African Union in 
Kampala to adopt the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa, the first legal instrument of its kind to bind an entire 
region on internal displacement.
287
 The convention, in its preamble, underscores the 
need to "promote and strengthen regional and national measures to prevent or 
mitigate, prohibit and eliminate root causes of internal displacement as well as 
provide for durable solutions."
288
 It references and reinforces the UN Guiding 
Principles of Internal Displacement, and elaborates on the obligations of States in all 
phases of displacement, from prevention to protection and facilitation of sustainable 
return, integration, or relocation.
289
 
Notably, the Convention prohibits displacement as a military strategy and 
requires States to criminalize acts of arbitrary displacement and hold responsible 
those who commit these acts, including both State and non-state actors.
290
 It also 
requires States to  “prevent political, social, cultural, and economic exclusion and 
marginalization that are likely to cause displacement of populations or persons by 
virtue of their social identity, religion or political opinion.”291 It provides for the 
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resolution of disputes related to property and compensation and other forms of 
reparations for damage as a result of displacement.
292
 “It is a good convention,” said 
Dismas Nkunda of the New York-based International Refugee Rights Initiative. “The 
key test to the continent’s commitment to it will be the implementation…so we need 
to ensure that this convention is respected by setting some kind of benchmarks 
against which we will evaluate its implementation.”293 Hopefully the fact that this 
summit was held in Kampala is a sign of the government’s commitment to adjust 
their policies toward the displaced northern population. 
D. Leadership from within 
It is clear that nothing militarily has been successful in quenching the LRA up 
to this point, and peace negotiations have not born fruit. In January, the Security 
Council “strongly condemned the recent attacks” by the LRA and “emphasized that 
those responsible must be brought to justice.”294 The United States has included the 
LRA in its Terrorist Exclusion List and in August 2008 added Kony to its list of 
“specially designated global terrorists.”295 The U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute 
and has maintained a hostile position toward its existence, nevertheless it supported 
the recent military operation against the LRA, and many suggest that the US could 
still help finish the job if it increased its support.
296
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Recently, for instance, a bill has gained momentum in the House and Senate 
called the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. This bill 
emphasizes that apprehending top LRA commanders is the key to ending the 
violence, and calls President Obama to invest in a second military operation and 
support reconciliation and transitional justice initiatives in the war-affected 
communities.
297
 A report by Enough, an American think tank, notes that the LRA’s 
“highly centralized hierarchy is one of the rebel group’s key weaknesses,”298 insisting 
that the atrocities will continue as long as Kony and other top commanders are at 
large. However tricky it will be, they suggest a counterinsurgency targeted strictly at 
the leaders to avoid widespread civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch also 
emphasizes that “US - not Ugandan - leadership is a key component in any 
multilateral strategy to protect civilians and apprehend the groups commanders.”299 
However, Mo Ibrahim, the Sudanese-born cellphone pioneer who founded the  
Index of Governance that ranks the quality of Africa’s governments, said that at the 
heart of building peace is the need for real leadership, not from foreign powers like 
the US, but from within the country.
300
 Acholi mythology emphasizes that a chief’s 
power is not absolute, that he “must earn his position and demonstrate his ability to 
lead his subjects.”301 How does one lead but by ensuring that people have their needs 
met, enough food to eat and a hope for the future for their children, distributing 
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wealth and investing resources so that the social fabric is tightly interwoven and 
strong. 
For example, President Joaquin Chissano stopped the civil war in 
Mozambique by “extending his hand to his enemy” and treating them as fellow 
citizens, inviting them to fight peacefully in free and fair elections.
302
 Ibrahim 
describes the day that Chissano won the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African 
leadership, saying they could not find him to give him his prize. He was deep in the 
bush somewhere between Sudan and Uganda searching for Kony to secure peace 
between the Ugandan government and the LRA, and that day also happened to be his 
68
th
 birthday.  
Also in South Africa, it took the leadership of Nelson Mandela to facilitate a 
peaceful transition of power from the apartheid regime to a non-racial democracy. 
Mandela defined his task as “reconciliation, of binding the wounds of the country, of 
engendering trust and confidence.”303 His sense of shared humanity enabled him to 
deal with others on equal footing, even his enemies and oppressors, without 
humiliating them. He would not condone their abuse of power, but believed that all 
men are capable of changing if their hearts are touched. His goal was to “liberate the 
oppressed and the oppressor both.”304 His attitude was crucial to generating the will 
of divided people to move towards each other despite so many years of colonial 
devastation and the oppression of apartheid. 
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To this day, “it’s the idea of Nelson Mandela that remains the glue that binds 
South Africa together,” said Mondli Makhanya, editor in chief of The Sunday 
Times…There’s the love of the man, but there’s also the question: Who will bind 
us?”305 Giving back to Ugandans their sense of citizenship and inclusion in society 
will be no easy task. However, it begins with a leader who will stand and say with 
Mandela, “I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black 
domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all 
persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities.”306  
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V. Conclusion 
It’s difficult to say when a war actually begins, because history reaches back 
farther than we often admit. Modern explanations of conflict in Africa tend to be 
reductionist, minimizing the complex social, political, and historical realities that play 
into armed resistance in favor of single root causes like ethnicity and religion and 
even colonialism. None of these are the single root cause of today’s conflict between 
the LRA and the Ugandan government, however. Ethnicity is a significant aspect 
because just as ethnic codification was a primary means of control for colonial 
powers, so ethnic belonging has been used as an instrument of resistance, and made 
the foundation for differentiating oneself in political and cultural terms. In the same 
way the colonialists imposed their “truth” onto people and subjugated them under the 
weight of imperial ascendancy, indigenous political leaders have maintained a 
hierarchical approach to engaging with the “other” in their own country, be it rebels, 
ethnic or religious groups, or geographical sub-regions.  
Specifically, the Acholi have been marginalized by Museveni’s government in 
part because of a presupposition that they are inherently violent and barbaric, a 
stereotype that can be traced back to the colonial perception of the Acholi as war-like. 
The LRA atrocities are associated with the northerners in general and Acholi in 
particular, and they are therefore treated with disdain. Ugandans themselves have 
even expressed concern about this “fixation of meaning to a limited set of cultural and 
  81 
ethnic stereotypes that propaganda of war and chauvinistic politics impose upon the 
local social realities and national order of things.”307  
If absolute power and monopoly of resources is the highest goal, it’s in the 
government’s interest to elevate itself not only rhetorically, but also existentially 
through uneven development, forced displacement, and general policies of violence 
and exclusion. This approach to governance is a highly destructive and shortsighted, 
though. As the social fabric is torn under the weight of the divisive and denigrating 
approach of this government toward its citizens, unraveling continues at the 
interpersonal and community level. Families, neighbors, tribes, towns, and entire 
geographical regions are split and pit against each other on every imaginable term, 
with violence perpetuating violence and bitterness rooting itself into society.  
What’s needed to break this cycle is for everyone to find consensus in a 
historical national narrative that unveils the heart of the conflict, with its many 
threads and evolving storyline. The weapons of truth and forgiveness must be used to 
end the mythology of lies, and with greater force than the weapons of war so long 
used by the colonial powers, and now by both the government and the LRA.  Shalom 
in Uganda will only be possible when there is a radical shift in the way people see 
and relate to one another, when a common national identity prevails over ethnic, 
religious, historical, and other divisions, and when the thread of shared humanity is 
held up as the one that has been holding the torn fabric together through it all. 
The foundation of truth and reconciliation in the elevation of shared humanity 
is radically empowered by an understanding of human rights from a biblical 
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worldview. The racist and religious superiority behind imperialism and colonialism, 
fueling division violence and bitterness in Ugandan society, is exposed for what it 
really is in light of the religious definition of humanity and our interconnectedness 
with one another in a flourishing community. The idealism in this hope is not 
practical on the surface, especially with the emphasis on retributive justice and 
criminal punishment, so the next question would be how to build a seemingly utopist 
Ugandan society out of the inveterate pattern of retaliation and devastation of 
protracted conflict. 
However practical it may seem to get even to get justice, civil rights champion 
and preacher Martin Luther King Jr. humbly observed how the practical way has “led 
inexorably to deeper confusion and chaos. Time is cluttered with the wreckage of 
communities which surrendered to hatred and violence.”308 He sympathized with our 
temptation to retaliate, but soberly concludes, “if this happens, the new order we seek 
will be litter more than a duplicate of the old order,” and instead “we must in strength 
and humility meet hate with love.”309 
Dr. King courageously declared, “the darkness of racial injustice will be 
dispelled only by the light forgiving love,” which is the “the most potent instrument 
available in mankind’s quest for peace and security.”310 This love, “so beautifully 
exemplified in the life our Christ,”311 can be summed up in three simple words: “love 
your enemies.” Injustice and oppression are destroyed by these words, and as they are 
                                                 
308
 Martin Luther King Jr., Strength to Love 55-57 (Fortress Press, 1981), available at 
http://loveyourenemies.wordpress.com/2009/02/06/isnt-love-impractical-mlk/. 
309
 Id.   
310
 Id. 
311
 Id. 
  83 
instead wielded as a weapon in Uganda, they will accomplish the seemingly 
insurmountable by empowering and reconciling all members of society to one 
another.  
